

A Constructivist Approach Towards Sino-Indian Relations

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Abstract

The slow process of socialization is a challenge to the construction of the Sino-Indian identities and interests given the evolution in the idea of cooperation. Currently, China and India are economically interdependent on each other due to their respective economic needs for growth. According to the social constructivist approach, there is room for cooperative engagement between China and India. In fact, socialization of state actors is the central causal process in constructivism which links actors and structures together. Socialization enables new ideas and thinking patterns, feelings and actions which lead to both expected and unexpected outcomes. In present times, varying ideas and identities have considerable influence on the conduct of relations among states. For constructivists, states do not necessarily engage in power-centric politics all the time. A rather pressing point when using the constructivist trajectory which evidently reflects in the Sino-Indian relations is the point and periods of uncertainty and the emergence of ideas over the passage of time. For instance, national interest can be regarded as socially constructed, essentially using various agents of socialization. In Sino-Indian relations particularly, most part of national interest is derived from national identities. This paper seeks to explain and understand the Sino-Indian engagements, competition and co-operation in matters relating to national identity and interests.

Keywords: China, India, Constructivism

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Introduction

The constructivist school of thought contends that ideas shape the behaviours of state actors, who in turn mould and influence the world politics. The fundamental question that constructivists deal with revolves around the interplay between identity and interest. They disregard the presence of two kind of structures, the material structure and the non-material structure (ideas). These two structures shape the behaviour and state actors actively influence the structures. The relations between China and India are multi-layered having a mixture of competition and co-operation. China has emerged as a rising regional power focused on economic development, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. On the other hand, India has a unique identity with diverse cultures, languages and religions. India is just like China a rising regional power and an active contender struggling to acquire 'great power' status at international level and economic development with territorial integrity. In this context, it is important to understand that how the Sino-Indian national identities and interests can be shaped through a cognitive process of relations. The number of actors in Chinese foreign policy has increased and it has become pluralistic in nature with private enterprises, research institutions, and NGOs.

Identities and socialization are two important concepts and have a strong impact on institutions and world politics. Both are individually and socially constructed resulting in new ideas that influence the existing beliefs and ideas. Constructivists emphasize upon how these ideas define identities and interests, which in return impart meaning to the material capabilities and behaviour of the actors. Anarchy between allies and anarchy between bitter rivals have different meanings. Constructivists are of the view that in international politics the concept of national interest is an important explanatory tool. National interest and identity play a vital role, both domestically and internationally between China and India. It also depends upon the significance of public discourse or perception forming identities that in return affect how these identities or actors shape the Sino-Indian relations. In other words, public discourses or images make changes in an actor's identity constructions.

On regional level, India is the most important neighbour for China, but on international level, there are many issues in-between such as world order, sovereignty, co-operation and human rights. Indian foreign policy toward China can be characterized by three elements i.e. Neo-Liberalism, Nehruvianism, and Hyper-realism. These three characters view China as friendly, mainstream and hostile respectively. Neo-liberalism emphasizes the importance of free market economy and upholds that harmony of interest is not a natural process. Instead, it needs to be created through institutions. On the

other hand, Nehruvianism has four pillars i.e. foreign policy of non-alignment, socialist economics, staunch secularism and democratic institution-building. Nehruvian adherents are of the view that it is possible for India to establish peace and cooperation with Pakistan, while Neo-liberals contend that economic ties would strengthen ties even with China.¹ Hyper-realists view the rise of China as expansionist and aggressive; therefore, it is important for India to strengthen its military muscles to contain China. However, it is evident from contemporary relations that the border issue between India and China is long-standing. At the same time, there is an increasing possibility that China and India may develop strong and cordial relations so that both the countries can effectively avoid uncertainty of events. Along with cooperation in economic and political spheres, there is also room for cooperation on military activities.

Sino-Indian Relations: Historical Perspective

To understand Sino-Indian relations through a constructivist approach, it is imperative to take into account historical background in order to connect the issues. The connections of past and present give a conclusion to the Sino-Indian relations and explain the constants. Following is a brief history of the Sino-Indian relations with the constructivist approach. Chinese and Indian relations date back to the mid-twentieth century, based on similar nature of challenges of poverty, economic development, and national integration that both countries faced as newly independent states.² In 1962, China and India had their first territorial conflict over Tibet, which complicated relations between the two countries. The conflict had its roots in the 1914 British-Indian government drawn McMahon line of border demarcation. The line has never been accepted by either the Chinese or the Indian state. Later in the years that followed, the constructivism of Nehru shaped peaceful relations. In 1979, when Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee was visiting Beijing for the first time after the war to give new dimensions to the Sino-Indian relations, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said:

“We should have a common ground while resolving the differences. As for the boundary question between our two countries is concerned, we can solve it through peaceful negotiation.”³

¹ Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay and Ashok Kapur, *Modi's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: SAGE Publishing India, 2017), 197.

² Mohan Malik. *China and India: Great Power Rivals* (India: FirstForumPress, 2011), 1.

³ B. M. Jain, “India–China Relations: Issues and Emerging Trends,” *The Round Table* 93, no. 374 (2004): 256.

The statement clearly marked the construction of new cordial relations. It made both countries realize their bilateral benefits. Later, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China further paved the way for promotion of peace and coexistence. Afterward, the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin visited India and signed four agreements in 1996. Both states agreed on demilitarization of their line of Actual Control (LAC) along with Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). These agreements started a new era of Sino-Indian relations. Meanwhile, numerous violations occurred on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The dimensions of the relations changed when India became a nuclear power. India's nuclearization in 1998 and its declaration of China as the 'number one potential threat' that led to its decision to nuclearize caused great consternation in China.⁴ In this regard, Pakistan's strategic significance also heightened and it eventually tested its nuclear capabilities in 1998 to deter India.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China in 2003 strengthened the economic relations. This visit initiated an era of cooperation and competition between the two states. When Hu Jintao came to power in 2002, an intensive discussion on China's new role in international politics started regarding the rise of China and other international challenges.⁵ Likewise, for the promotion of the concept of 'peaceful development', Sino-Indian relations projected immense potential for cordiality and friendliness. It is however important, not to forget about the constraint setup by the historical disputes that are continuing to exist in China and India's security paradigm.⁶

The Political and Economic Foundations

China and India came into existence with similar economic conditions marked by low incomes and extremely large populations. Later, both the states brought agricultural reforms to cope up with self-imposed economic isolation. The bilateral trade between China and India increased in the late 1980s by the political leadership in both states. Consequently, numerous trade agreements were signed with the passage of time. India brought plenty of economic reforms for the strengthening of border trade routes. Present bilateral trade relations can construct future bilateral trade relations, as well as strategic relations.

⁴ Gillian Hui Lynn GOH, *China and India: Towards Greater Cooperation and Exchange* (Singapur: Singapur University Press, 2006), 270.

⁵ Yang Lu, "Dynamics of National Interest and National Identity: A constructivist approach to the India-China relations from 2003-2012," (master's thesis, Heidelberg University, 2013).

⁶ Jonna Johansson. "China-India Relations: Complex Challenges in a Complex Relationship," (*thesis*, Högskolan i Halmstad, 2012), 29.

China is currently the world's largest exporter of goods and with six of the world top 10 seaports, it has witnessed 9.9 per cent annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate since 2001.⁷ China had already introduced its open door policy in the late 1970s. India, albeit at a slower pace grew at a healthy average of 7.8 per cent over the last decade.⁸ In recent past economic relations have seen stability due to change in state policies at local and international level. This increased economic trade has created interdependence both politically and socially.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to China in 2008 further strengthened the relations. Thus, an economic relation is likely to reshape the ideas among the public as well as the leaders. Despite border disputes between China and India, a steady increase in trade and an increasing amount of cooperation is on its way to take place between the two giants.⁹ India's socio-political and economic development may create hurdles for its global aspirations. For India, it depends upon constructed priorities for future and avenues for development. While in both countries foreign founded enterprises have been on significant rise.¹⁰

Cooperation can be further increased through mutual gains, especially in the energy sector. To supply economic development, both the countries are struggling to get their hands on energy resources. In this regard, China-India cooperation in Sudan successfully worked out over oil trade. Textiles and apparel is another cardinal sector in which both countries share a common interest. China has relatively larger textile industry than India. For that, focus should be dedicated toward ensuring collaboration and emerging opportunities. While the expanding spheres of economic interactions can bring limited market access due to intensive industries. Protectionism is another constraint to save the national economic interests of both states. There is a chance of operational risks for both the countries in this regard. There are many policy issues that need to be resolved accordingly. It is also not certain if economic relations could reduce the biases over security issues but, it has constructed a vital role between the two countries.

⁷ Joe Thomas Karackattu, "India-China Economic Relations: Trends, Challenges and Policy Options," *Institute of Chinese Studies* last modified December 2013, <https://www.icsin.org/uploads/2015/04/12/687ac86c3493814b292fb342bd037cc2.pdf>.

⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

⁹ Jonna Johansson, "China-India Relations: Complex Challenges in a Complex Relationship," p. 37.

¹⁰ Herbert Wulf, "India's Aspirations in Global Politics: competing ideas and amorphous practices," INEF Report, Universität Duisburg-Essen: Institute for Development and Peace, 2013, <http://edoc.vifapoll.de/opus/volltexte/2013/4522/pdf/report107.pdf>.

The Sino-Indian Foreign Policy

The Sino-Indian foreign policy is marked by abundance of tensions. In the wake of realization by the concerned officials, there have been strong motives to keep the relations stable. The salient tenet in Chinese foreign policy has long been the safeguarding of sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹¹ While, Indian policymakers take genuine pride in the nation's democratic values and its contributions to the development of multilateralism as Delhi faced considerable difficulty in coping with some important challenges which emerged since the end of the Cold War.¹² On its founding, the People's Republic of China (PRC) announced that its foreign policy would be guided by the rules and norms of 'peaceful coexistence'.¹³ China has been trying to pursue its foreign policy of harmonious world and to face the challenges of regional security. Over the past few years, Chinese foreign policy has changed significantly and now there are considerations for a more pluralistic orientation.¹⁴ Currently, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has considerable influence on China's foreign policy toward the US, Southeast Asia and India.

Indian non-alignment principle policy was a posture to stay out of the Cold War. Its economic and military weaknesses prompted India's foreign policy officials to build ties with both the Soviet Union and the United States.¹⁵ There is a similar concern to have bilateral relations with China. Indian policies toward China are broadly debated and handled at the highest level of political leadership. On the contrary, Chinese policies toward India are managed by the foreign affairs and military bureaucracies.¹⁶ Along with this, Indian foreign policymakers have always been attracted to the Asia-Pacific region.

The Sino-Indian Regional Security Dynamics

The security dynamics of Sino-Indian relations are considerably complex and mostly depend upon perceptions. Despite this, both China and India share ideological differences between Maoism and Nehruvianism. Given the history and complexity of relations, the Chinese remain sceptical of India's position on Tibet.¹⁷ There is a constant pulling and tugging and security ties with neighbouring countries especially the Chinese ties with the Asian countries rather than India.

¹¹ Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski, *Crux of Asia: China, India and the Emerging Global Order* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment Publications, 2013), 30.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 58

¹³ Shalendra D. Sharma, *China and India In The Age Of Globalization* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 212.

¹⁴ Yang Lu, "Dynamics of National Interest and National Identity: A constructivist approach to the India-China relations from 2003-2012," p. 2.

¹⁵ Nalinikant Jha and Subhash Shukla, *India's Foreign Policy Emerging Challenges* (Shahpur Jat: Pentagon Press, 2012), 274.

¹⁶ Baladas Ghoshal. "China's Perception of India: Look East Policy," *Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis*, 2013, 10.

¹⁷ Mohan Malik. *China and India: Great Power Rivals* (India: FirstForumPress, 2011), 139.

The security ties have created suspicion between both the Asian powers. The concept of anarchy constructed by individuals brings a security dilemma. The national identities in the course of shaping and influencing interests bear responsibility for their own security. Moreover, as under the constructivist approach, the change in such constructed ideas and intentions is extremely rapid, while the capabilities on the other hand, do not change at the same pace. Intentions and capabilities influence leaders, while a state's quest for military muscle is central to security dilemma. These national identities shape national interests in order to ensure protection. China is deeply suspicious about Indian policies toward Tibet.¹⁸ Beijing understands that as in the past and so in the future, once unrest erupts in Tibet, India cannot completely wash its hands off the Tibetan affairs.¹⁹ India has been trying to have control over Tibet, while China has been neutralizing its control. To make matter worse, there is a growing belief that the Tibetan refugees in India and elsewhere are the source of China's problems in Tibet.²⁰

The security dilemma between China and India does not require aggressive or hostile intentions from each other, but the psychological dynamics have potential for them. On the other hand, China's naval superiority poses a challenge to India's security dynamics. Both China and India believe that their international stature is at stake when interacting with each other.²¹ Each side believes in potential threats due to their respective military capabilities. Misperception can be constructed due to the situation. Both China and India have already been maintaining defensive approaches, primarily based on the perceptions constructed as a result of security dynamics.

The primary concern in Sino-Indian security dynamics is the expansion of political and security relations with neighbouring countries. The emerging Indo-US partnership based on a tangible strategic shift in policy towards one another is backed by strong public support in each country.²² Secondly, it pins down along the Himalayas, hundreds of thousands of Indian troops who otherwise would be available against China's 'all-weather ally', Pakistan.²³ China also has both civilian and military relations with Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Furthermore, the construction of relations with their neighbouring countries may shift the balance of power in the region. Due to Pakistan, India is confronting with the two-front threat and is unable to concentrate only on one front. Tibet is also the bone of contention that led to the Sino-Indian

¹⁸ Joh W. Garvor "Security Dilemma Between Sino-Indian Relations," *India Review* 1, no. 4 (2002): 2.

¹⁹ Mohan Malik, *China and India: Great Power Rivals* (India: FirstForumPress, 2011).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

²¹ Joh W. Garvor, "Security Dilemma Between Sino-Indian Relations," p. 3.

²² Brahma Chellaney, *Asian Juggernaut: The Rise Of China, India And Japan* (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2007), 235.

²³ *Ibid.*, 170.

war in 1962. India desires to make Tibet a buffer state.²⁴ But currently, India has reduced its aggressive policies over Tibet because it would have to confront a greater power. New Delhi sought to allay Beijing's suspicions about Indian designs on Tibet by supporting the Seventeen-Point Agreement between Tibetan delegates and China in 1951, which recognized PRC sovereignty over Tibet and guaranteed the existing socio-political arrangements.²⁵

China's Naval Expansion

China expanded its vision of maritime power with the notion of 'far seas operations'. Its naval expansion created many suspicions for India. China desires sea routes for its trade and a powerful navy is essential for China to establish strategic influence in East Asian mainland which would challenge the US in its maritime spheres of influence so that it can become a 'rising power' throughout East Asia.²⁶ On the other hand, the social constructivist view holds that China has been socialized into the positive-sum thinking of cooperative security through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which has included the Indian Ocean in its discussions of maritime cooperation.²⁷ Social constructivists, with their argument - a cooperative security discourse can restrain the behaviour of even those who use it instrumentally by making it difficult for them to propose and pursue realpolitik courses of action - would take the efforts toward China-India maritime cooperation much more seriously.²⁸

China's naval authority wanted Indian's naval authority to be associated with the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) as an observer. However, India refused to accept it. India did so primarily because large Chinese trade volume passes through and the concerns raised by IONS states that the Chinese naval force might pursue anti-piracy operations. China announced International Naval Escort (INE) with India and Japan over the Gulf of Aden. Though these kinds of cooperation ventures can increase the maritime security cooperation and the safeguarding of international navigation, the reality is much more complicated. The concept of 'harmonious oceans' should be extended, and both the countries must follow a suitable response.

²⁴ Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski. *The crux of Asia: China, India and the Emerging Global Order* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment Publications, 2013), 301.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

²⁶ T.V Paul, James J. Witz and Michel Fortmann. *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (California: Standard University Press, Stanford, 2004), 293.

²⁷ "China India and the Indian Ocean: Need to Move from Balance of Power to Cooperation," *Institute of Chinese Studies* (2002), 1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

China's future naval plans which include permanent deployments in the Indian Ocean are an integral part of Beijing's energy strategy.²⁹ The control of routes overseas has great importance for the rise and fall of great powers. So, the control over the Indian Ocean is in the vital interest of China. Pakistan's Gwadar deep-sea port has been built with the help of China. Gwadar is developing as a transit terminal for oil imports but also to facilitate Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, enabling it to 'monitor the US naval activity in the Persian Gulf, and future US-Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean.'³⁰

For the protection of sea routes, China has been expanding its naval activities in the region. By building ports, harbours and maritime communication stations to show the Chinese trade and strategic importance. In this regard, Pakistan and Myanmar are the two major allies of China. The Chinese 'String of Pearls' strategy to encircle India through an active naval presence in Myanmar and Bangladesh, besides other South Asian states, is a matter of security concern to India.³¹ China has supported the construction of seaports in India for maritime access. On the other hand, a sustained and strengthened Pakistan is the core interest of China for maintaining balance of power in the region. Lui Huaqing has a vision for China's naval expansion. This vision aimed to make China a blue-water naval power capable of projecting power in the high seas by 2050.³² In this regard, constructivists are of the view, that states do not engage in power politics all the time, and that the military use of power is not to be the solution every time.

India's Response to China's Naval Expansion

According to the Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2004, India's growing naval activities have been called 'legitimate core of interest'. India considers the South China Sea as a secondary, and the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the narrow seas as primary areas of trade. The Indian navy in Malacca Strait has been actively working against piracy. Indian response to Chinese naval expansion reflects simultaneously optimism and pessimism. Pessimists view the increase in China's maritime power as a threat to Indian

²⁹ Mohan Malik. *China and India: Great Power Rivals*. India: FirstForumPress, 2011: 207

³⁰ Baladas Ghoshal, "China's Perception of India: Look East Policy," *Institute for Defence and Strategic Analysis* (2013): 17-18

³¹ Sithar Fernando, "China's Relations with Indian Ocean Region: Combining Realist and Constructivist Perspectives," *Institute for Chinese Studies* (2012): 2-3.

³² Nalinikant Jha and Subhash Shukla, *India's Foreign Policy Emerging Challenges* (Shahpur Jat: Pentagon Press, 2012), 127.

security. They argue that in order to reduce this danger, the rest of the world should stand firm against China and contain its expansionist tendencies.³³

The optimistic view looks at China as cooperative, essentially motivated by social constructivism and focused on economy. China became a dialogue partner of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Moreover, China was debated a lot in the Indian media for setting its naval and military build-up. China's support for Pakistan has further added to India's suspicions. India in turn, sought to shore up its naval projections by holding regular naval exercises with the US, Japan, Australia, and Singapore close to Coco Islands, and near the strategic strait of Malacca. In response, China openly criticized the navy exercises. India like China has been trying to expand its spheres of influence in the region. India's growing strategic alliances with the US and Japan has created troubles for China. China has been actively participating with South Eastern countries for building up its economic and maritime relations. Ever since the end of the Cold War, India's interest in the region has been on the rise. The materialisation of the aforesaid exercises in the South China Sea, which China claims as its territory has added a different dimension to India's naval activism.³⁴

In 2007, India abandoned its joint exercises with Japan and the US, but in 2011, India restarted it. China and India need energy supplies from the Persian Gulf states and oil and raw materials from Africa, and Africa needs the financial resources that the Gulf States are accumulating in unprecedented quantities.³⁵ India and China face a rising domestic demand for energy; they heavily rely on foreign suppliers of energy resources.³⁶

The Sino-Indian Rise: Threats, Opportunities and Challenges

The Sino-Indian rise to becoming major powers has been witnessed by the global system due to their dramatic economic growth. But in the process of becoming powerful, their potential impact and influence on the regional politics might also heighten. In the US, the most worked upon question is whether China's rise is bound to bring a conflict.³⁷ The redistribution of power has always created a conflict in the course of history. The Sino-Indian trajectory can be studied through the evolution of the

³³ Sithar Fernando, "China's Relations with Indian Ocean Region: Combining Realist and Constructivist Perspectives." *Institute for Chinese Studies* (2012): 5.

³⁴ Baladas Ghoshal, "China's Perception of India: Look East Policy," *Institute for Defence and Strategic Analysis* (2013): 73.

³⁵ Ryan Clarke, "Sino-Indian Strategic Relations: Assessing The Risk Of Great Power Rivalry In Asia," *EAI Working Paper* (2011): 19.

³⁶ Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski. *Crux of Asia: China, India and the Emerging Global Order* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment Publications, 2013).

³⁷ Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough. *Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers China And India* (Canada: The National Bureau of Asian Research (2011-12): 37.

US and China relations, and the tensions between China and India. Washington undoubtedly confronts serious pressure with regards to its short-term goals vis-à-vis both China and India while simultaneously responding to the long-term challenges by those states' rise in Asia and beyond.³⁸ On the other hand, another important question to answer is that how will China and India acquire their interests in the current global order? Whether the world is going to taste another economic order in addition to BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)? In addition, it has become critical to examine how the international economic system will respond to this Sino-Indian rise. China has been stressing to bring reforms in its state-owned enterprises, while India focuses to bring structural reforms. Although projecting China's long-term future is not easy, it is reasonable to believe that China's rise will continue and that it will become the largest economy, as measured by GDP, by 2030.³⁹ In fact, the fast-growing Chinese economy shall be exposed to unforeseen challenges. Its unique political system dominated by a single party different from the democratic capitalist economy.

China, however, has improved its relations with the neighbouring countries, but India has destabilised relations with its neighbouring states particularly with Pakistan. The dependency between China and Pakistan has been increasing and these relations may pose a challenge to the Sino-Indian relations. Despite recent efforts at de-escalation of tensions and the tenuous transitions to democracy in Pakistan, the danger of conflict, including an all-out war, remains high.⁴⁰ Pakistan is the cardinal regional competitor with India in terms of nuclear weapons capability. The selling of weapons by China to its neighbouring states has created a security dilemma for India.

On the other hand, the US has remarkably improved its strategic relations with India and limited its partnership with Pakistan. The greatest threat to Southeast Asia's strategic interests lies in the potential of great-power rivalry to undermine regional autonomy.⁴¹ Keeping close and cooperative relations with the US is the core interest of China in the region. The rise of China has challenged the hegemonic stability of the US for the past six decades.

Since the end of the Cold War, India has been facing the threats of external intervention, in terms of humanitarian crisis and transnational security. India has a free market economy and comprehensive strategic partnership with the US. In addition, India has been making efforts for inclusive security of the

³⁸ Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski. *Crux of Asia: China, India and the Emerging Global Order* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment Publications, 2013): 6.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁴⁰ Shalendra D. Sharma, *China and India In The Age Of Globalization* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 267.

⁴¹ Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough, *Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers China And India* (Canada: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011-12): 317.

region along with a trilateral relationship with Japan. The rise of China may pose serious threats to India and the Indian Ocean region. The strategic uncertainty has not been clarified by China that is based around the means it uses to protect common global principles.

Conclusion

The rise of China would transform the regional and global order in meaningful ways. India on the other hand, has added another dimension to Asian regionalism. The evolution of Sino-Indian relations through the process of social constructivism and understanding national identity and interest is unpredictable. It was said earlier that the question of identity and interest is what the social constructivism is dealing with. Now the relations are depending upon each other's policymakers in shaping their interests. How the identities construct their interests through socialization and prevail on security issues. The Sino-Indian cooperation is a vital opportunity to the socialization of China in the region. However, the structural factors can also play an important role in the Sino-Indian relations by emphasizing on developments rather than security.