Insurgency in Balochistan
Mahnnoor Saleem*
Abstract
Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of territory and is equally
resourceful. Due to decades of remorse and hostlity toward the federaton, it has
witnessed several years of deprivaton and waves of ethno-natonalist insurgency.
Since the incepton of Pakistan, a number of social, sectarian, economic, ethnic
and politcal reasons have contributed to this insurgency. However, over the years,
a predominantly secular separatst struggle has turned into sectarian and ethnic
conflict, primarily afer the death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugt in unfortunate
circumstances. Moreover, as this paper argues, these communal rifs among
Baloch are being supported and exploited by external actors for the sake of their
own interests.
Keywords: Balochistan, Pakistan, Insurgency, Counter Insurgency
* Mahnnoor Saleem is a student of Internatonal Relatons at Natonal Defence University
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Introducton
According to Bard O’ Neill, an insurgency is “a struggle between non-
ruling authorites in which, the non-ruling group consciously uses politcal
resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of
legitmacy of one or more aspects of politcs.”1 It can also be defined as
“an organised movement aiming to overthrow a consttuted government
using subversion and armed conflict.”2 These definitons reflect the
desperate situaton in Balochistan aptly; as for over seven decades,
Balochistan has proved to be the most troublesome province of Pakistan.
Unlike many other conflicts, which emerged inside Pakistan, insurgency
in Balochistan is the only one that persisted for such a long period. The
foundatons of separatsm were laid in the region since the accession of
various administratve units consttutng modern day Balochistan in 1948.
Over the decades, the insurgency has grown and brewed primarily in
several districts of the province. It is the largest among all four provinces
with an area as vast as 347,190 km square3 and a populaton of 12.34
million people4. Due to geographical terrain favourable for an insurgency,
the region has witnessed several waves of ethno-natonalist insurgency
over the past seven decades. The paper addresses following research
questons:
• How did the insurgency in Balochistan emerge and proliferate over
the years?
• What is the role of ethnic and religious dimensions of insurgency in
Balochistan?
• Why the previous regimes could not succeed in taking care of this
1 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutonary Warfare, (USA: Brassey’s
Inc., 1990), 13.
2 Joint Chiefs Of Staff Washington Dc. “Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning,” 2002. htps://doi.
org/10.21236/ada526053.
3 Administrator. About Balochistan - Government of Balochistan. Accessed December 26, 2019.
4 “Populaton of Balochistan Census 2017.” Populaton of Balochistan Census 2017 Detail Informaton
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insurgency effectvely?
• What are the ramificatons and consequences of the on-going
insurgency in Balochistan?
Theoretcal Framework
According to David Galula, there are a few eminent prerequisites of waging
a successful insurgency. He argues that the insurgents need to have an
atractve cause, “preferably an ideological cause” which can mobilise and
gather as much supporters as possible. A long-term ideological cause is
impossible to defeat even, by utlising all the machinery of the state itself.
Secondly, the insurgents must detect the weakness in Counterinsurgency
(COIN) camp. By a COIN camp, he certainly meant that the government
and the state’s natonal military against whom insurgents engage by
threatening and challenging their power as part of an insurgency. Thirdly,
geographical terrain plays a vital role in this kind of conflict. Rigorous
temperatures and unnavigable landscapes can make it difficult for the
counter-insurgency forces to operate. However, the insurgents are most
likely the indigenous people of those ardent areas. The larger the area,
the harder it would be for state authorites to administer properly.
Moreover, having a border or two in that area also succours insurgent’s
mission. Lastly, Galula believes extrinsic support given to these insurgency
movements also plays a vital role in escalatng the issue. It is not necessary
that the support only comes in the form of military; in fact, it can also be
entrely moral, explicitly economic or entrely diplomatc. “The first two
are musts, geography is usually predetermined and the last one is help
that might become a necessity.”5
The host naton of the counterinsurgent camp is relatvely at the
losing end of such a warfare primarily, because “it is usually a cheap war
for the insurgents, but likely very costly for the COIN.6” Galula used the
5 Galula, David, and John A. Nagl. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practce. New Delhi:
Pentagon Press, 2010.
6 Ibid. 11
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Insurgency in Balochistan
metaphor “A lion and a fly”7 depictng them as the state and the insurgents.
Just like a fly, an insurgent can cause a great deal of trouble if he reaches
up to the eye of a lion. Even though the lion is invincible if compared
to a fly, in this scenario the lion will lose. Insurgents do not have to use
sophistcated machinery or update their weaponry in order to strengthen
the cause. Once they gain supporters and an audience among the general
masses, they become impossible to tame.
While explaining the prerequisites of counterinsurgency warfare,
Galula highlights four basic instruments which a state needs to utlise in
order to gain victory over the insurgents namely the politcal structure
of the government, the administratve bureaucracy, the police, and
the armed forces.8 The politcal and administratve establishment are
necessary to keep the show running as they resolve day-to-day maters.
Their smooth functoning gives a sense of hope and purpose to the COIN
movement. As the police and armed forces are the first ones to interact
with the supporters of the insurgency, their behaviour with the local
people largely determines the support of these people for the insurgents
or the government. Moreover, loyalty or repatriaton of the members of
the armed forces is also crucial.9
Galula describes two paterns which the insurgents follow in pursuit
of their objectves. Galula labelled the first as an orthodox and the second
as a shortcut patern. The former lasts longer than the later as it engages
in and involves politcal partes or fronts in the insurgent’s plan. In case of
Balochistan, the Baloch insurgents are following an orthodox patern of
insurgency. This includes five steps: creaton of a politcal party, formaton
of a united front, initaton of guerrilla warfare and movement warfare,
and lastly, annihilaton of government, all this in order to completely
7 Ibid, 15
8 Ibid. 27
9 Vrooman, Stephen. “A Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept: The Galula Compass,” 2005.
htps://doi.org/10.21236/ada436240.
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destroy the government and to bring the politcal party on the front.10 The
insurgency in Balochistan certainly tried to follow this game plan however,
their trajectory over the last few years explains where and how they lost.
Historical Background of the Insurgency
Due to its strategic locaton, Balochistan was part of a great game between
the Britsh and the Russian empires of history.11 While reaching a truce,
both the actors divided this land among each other. The Great Britain
in India, along with Iran and Afghanistan, took a part of Balochistan
and redrew their boundaries. In pursuit of maximising their wealth and
resources, both the empires neglected
the potental of an uprising.12 Pakistan got its independence in 1947 from
a united India which was then ruled by the Britsh Empire. During the
partton of Indian subcontnent, 565 princely states were given an open
choice to accede with their desired state (Pakistan or India) based upon
their geographical proximity and religious affinity. 13
In 1947, Balochistan was divided into the following three parts:
• Chief commissioner’s province (directly administered by the Britsh
Empire)
• Princely states (Kalat, Kharan, Lasbela and Makran)
• Gwadar (under the rule of Oman)
The princely states of Kharan, Lasbela and Makran formally acceded
to Pakistan in 1952, whereas, state of Kalat acceded to the country in
10 Galula, David, and John A. Nagl. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practce. New Delhi:
Pentagon Press, 2010.
11 Heathcote, T. A. Balochistan, the Britsh and the Great Game: the Struggle for the Bolan Pass,
Gateway to India. London: Hurst & Company, 2015.
12 ibid.
wpcd/wp/p/Politcal_integraton_of_India.htm.
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Insurgency in Balochistan
1955.14
The Surrender of the Khan
Following the accession of Kalat to Pakistan, the first wave of insurgency
triggered when Khan of Kalat’s brother Prince Abdul Karim rebelled with
700 fighters only to die later in 1948. The second wave of insurgency dates
back to the 1960s when, Nauroz Khan of Zarakzai (Zehri) tribe rebelled
with a thousand guerrilla fighters following the arrest of Khan of Kalat
Ahmed Yar Khan. Khan was arrested based on the charges that he colluded
with the Iranian officials for the independence of Balochistan.15 He also
revolted against Ayub Khan’s One Unit system. The uprising soon turned
into a tragedy when the Pakistani government convinced him via his
nephew “Doda Khan” to lay down arms and in exchange, the government
was ready to accept his demands. Nauroz set his differences aside, only to
find himself in jail in Hyderabad where he and his son were tried in military
courts.16His cause of death is stll unknown however, the government
claims that he died of old age while the natonalists believe that he was
hanged to death, just like his son.17
The third wave of insurgency was more like a contnuaton of the
second wave since the politcal and security landscape of Balochistan never
stabilised afer the death of Nauroz Khan. The Parrari movement of Sher
Muhammad Marri also gained support during this very decade. Parraris
were held responsible for multple atacks on civilian and armed forces
before a ceasefire was reached in 1969.18 A new cadre of politcal leaders
started to emerge during the 1970s but, another uprising only came into
14“WestminsterResearch
...”
Accessed
December
26,
2019.
htps://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/download/
e50e6b14a1447e03082205d9c0a4f9648d4665a9389f1b2e24d7f107c2f492e7/2206365/Gulawar_
KHAN_2014.pdf.
roots-of-resentment-ii/.
16 ibid
17 ibid.
18 Schmid, Alex P., and A. J. Jongman. Politcal Terrorism: a New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts,
Data Bases, Theories, & Literature. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.
Vol. 2, No. 2, December 2019
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play when in 1973, the then chief minister of Balochistan Sardar Ataullah
Khan Mengal and the governor of Balochistan Ghaus Bux Bizenjo were
dismissed from their positons.19 Later, on 15th February 1973, Nawab Akbar
Khan was appointed as the governor of Balochistan, only to resign on 1st
January next year.20 By this tme, the differences and mistrust between the
central and provincial governments had increased manifold. The situaton
worsened as foreign support from neighbours like Iran and Afghanistan
was now being provided to ethno-natonalist militant groups.21
Therefore, Zulfikar Ali Bhuto decided to launch a military operaton
in Balochistan. The decision of military operaton resulted in more
violence in the province as about 55,000 individuals rebelled against the
government.22 In brief, every tme, when an atempt was made to curb an
insurgency using military strength, the situaton only exacerbated.23
Latest Wave of Insurgency
The latest wave of insurgency started in the early 2000s, when General
Pervez Musharraf was in power. At that tme, Pakistan was already busy in
fightng militants in its tribal areas as part of the Global War on Terrorism
and was assistng American troops in Afghanistan against Afghan Taliban
and Al-Qaeda. Meanwhile, the Baloch ethno-natonalist militants saw an
opportunity in such a state of affairs. The insurgents were only multplying
in number and their atacks were gaining exponental strength. There
were around 122 explosions24 only on pipelines alone during this period.
19 Rehman, I.A. “Bizenjo and His Politcs.” DAWN.COM, December 21, 2017. htps://www.dawn.com/
news/1377965.
20 Muhammad Rizwan, Baloch Alienaton, Natonal Politcs and Conflict Resoluton in Pakistan,Pakistan
Journal/2019,%20No.1/7.%20Baloch%20Alienaton,%20Natonal%20Politcs%20,%20M%20Rizwan.
pdf
roots-of-resentment-ii/.
22 Pike, John.
“Military.” Balochistan Insurgency. Accessed December
26,
globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/balochistan-1973.htm.
23 “Commitee Finalizes Balochistan Report.” DAWN.COM, January 19, 2005. htps://www.dawn.com/
news/380536.
24 Mir JmilurRehman, Stage managed Turmoil, opinion, The News, 29 January 2005. Pg. 90
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One of their main high-profile atacks was the murder of Chinese
engineers who were working on the Gwadar project.25 In an atack that
took place on December 2004, around 11 people were killed and 30 were
wounded.26 In 2004 alone, 30 bomb atacks took place in Balochistan, the
Baloch Liberaton Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberaton Front (BLF)
claimed responsibility for the atacks, by saying that such atacks are mere
endeavours “to free Balochistan from Punjabi dominance.”27 Amidst this
seemingly endless turmoil and grievances of Baloch natonalists, common
Baloch people were also siding with ethno-natonalist militants by this
tme.28 Due to the economic disparity in the province and targeted atacks
on governmental facilites, it started to get obvious that if not dealt with
an iron fist, Pakistan might lose Balochistan just as East Pakistan.
On 2 January 2006, a military captain allegedly raped Dr. Shazia
Khaled on the premises of Pakistan Petroleum Limited in Sui, Balochistan.
This incident sparked province wide uprising and revolts, Nawab Akbar
Khan Bugt was outraged with such a turn of events. Bugts who number
around 150,000 implicated the rape incident on Army and asked them
to “go back to where it belonged and refrain from perpetratng such
incidents on Baloch soil.”29 Meanwhile, insurgents and militants also
ransacked Pakistan Petroleum facility. The insurgents were targetng
workers, gas pipelines, Fronter Corps and everything that was related to
the armed forces. The fight between insurgents and Pakistan army lasted
for full four days. During the standoff, insurgents fired 14,000 rounds of
small arms, 436 mortars and 60 rockets.30 At such a blatant act of rebellion
and such massive ammuniton support to ethno-natonalist militants, the
state of Pakistan finally started to queston the role of external factors in
25 Bansal, Alok. Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroads. New Delhi: Manas Publicatons, 2013.
pg. 89
26 Ghazi Salahuddin, A crisis of Governance, The News, 16 January 2005. htps://www.thenews.com.
pk/print/307416-the-crisis-of-pakistan
27Azizullah Khan, Sui Airport Razed in terrorist atack, The Herald, Karachi, 29. July, 2005
28 Bansal, Alok. Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroads. New Delhi: Manas Publicatons, 2013.
29Massoud Ansari, Nightmare at Sui, Newline, 25 February 2005. Pg 37.
30 Syed Irfan Raza and Arshad Sharif, Troops to protect Sui plant: Sherapo- operaton in the offing- ISPR.
DAWN, Karachi, 13 January 2005.
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this wave of insurgency. Where were the insurgents gaining support from
internatonally and internally in Balochistan, while the state was setng
in moton every plan to put them down. While addressing citzens at the
ground-breaking ceremony at Gwadar port in September 2007, President
Musharraf categorically said, “These elements (of insurgency) should be
wiped out of the country…. Nobody will be allowed to challenge the writ
of the government. This would not be allowed at any cost.”31 Intellectuals
and students of history, consider the assaults on President Musharraf on
December 14, 2005 to be executed by ethno-natonalist aggressors, as when
he was tending to Fronter Corps in Kohlu, eight rockets were terminated
at his camps.32 Later, on 15 December 2005, an atack was carried out by
the Baloch ethno-natonalist militants on Major General Shujaat Zamir
Dar, Inspector General of Fronter Corp and Deputy Inspector General FC
Brigadier Saleem Nawaz, in Kohlu while they were analysing the situaton
on the ground via helicopter, this was among one of the many reasons for
which the 2006 operaton started.33
On 2nd August 2006, Nawab Akbar Bugt along with his cadres died
in one of the caves at Kohlu. The entre country other than the province
of Punjab observed days of mourning over his death.34 A Baloch author
Yousaf Ajab Baloch described the killing of Nawab Bugt as the 9/11 of
Balochistan.35 The then Khan of Kalat, Mir Suleiman Daud convened a
grand Jirga afer Nawab’s demise and vowed to take up the assassinaton
in Internatonal Court of Justce against the state of Pakistan.36 This promise
was nothing more than rhetoric as the internatonal community has no say
31 “President’s Address at Groundbreaking Ceremony of Labour Colony (Gwadar Port Operaton)”, 17
November 2006, at htp://presidentofpakistan.gov.pk; “President Musharraf urges Balochis to resist
those against development”, 3 September 2007, at htp://presidentofpakistan.gov.pk.
aug/30guest.htm.
33Alok Bansal, Balochistan in Turmoil Pakistan at crossroads, New Delhi: manas publicatons, India.
Chapter 3, pg 97.
34 ibid.
35 Yousaf Ajab Baloch, Who caused the 9/11 of Balochistan, 25 October, 2013 htps://dailytmes.com.
pk/107849/who-caused-the-911-of-balochistan/
36 Nocent, Annie. “The Khan of Kalat Gathers the Tribes.” CounterPunch.org, January 29, 2016.
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in the internal maters of the state. In 2007, Balach Marri of BLA also died
under mysterious circumstances. Since then, Harbiyar Marri is leading
BLA.37
In 2009, when PPP was in power, the government launched an
operaton in Balochistan called “killing the killers.”38 Intelligence agencies,
Fronter Corps and armed forces, all took part in this operaton and
curbed the ethno-natonalists largely. The internatonal community
and Human Rights Watch highlighted human rights violatons in the
province, partcularly afer Declan Welsh wrote an opinion artcle in the
Guardian upon this mater. Welsh held the Pakistani intelligence agencies
responsible for human rights violatons in the province.39 Moreover,
he claimed that hundreds of people in the province are going missing
every day and around 15 bodies per month have started to show up on
road sides in Balochistan, which were all brutally tortured.40 The Senator
Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar, in conversaton upon this mater, categorically
denied any involvement of the Pakistani armed forces or agencies in any
sort of torture or inhumane actvites on ground. However, he indubitably
acknowledged that, “whenever you put boots on the ground, a certain
level of violence definitely takes place but even in such a scenario, the
Pakistani Armed forces never commited any act of violence against the
local civilians.” When asked about the grievances of Baloch regarding
the large influx of outsiders in Balochistan, which may turn them into a
minority the Senator replied that, “Anyone from around the world and
even from any corner of Pakistan could come and work in Gwadar. We do
not want to cap the economic flow, in any way whatsoever. If Baloch fear a
minority dilemma than they should rather start occupying seats and start
working on a project with Chinese and Pakistani forces.”
37 Shahid, Saleem. “Balach Marri Killed: Violence in Queta, Schools Closed.” DAWN.COM, November
38 Newspaper, From the. “Insurgents Suffer Bloody Reprisals.” DAWN.COM, June 26, 2011. htps://
39 Ahmed, Khaled. Sleepwalking to Surrender: Dealing with Terrorism in Pakistan. Gurgaon, Haryana,
India: Penguin/Viking, 2016.
40 Walsh, Declan. “Pakistan's Secret Dirty War.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, March 29,
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Role of Sectarian and Ethnic Groups
The sectarian and ethnic violence in Balochistan is interlinked. Such kind of
violence is not decades old, rather, it only started to emerge prominently
during the last two decades. However, seeds of sectarian conflict were
sown as early as 1979 Iranian Revoluton. The initators of Iranian revoluton
were keen in exportng revoluton all around the world. Pakistan has the
second highest Shia populaton in the world afer Iran, which consttutes
10-15 per cent, which is about 17-26 million people in numbers.41 Majority
of Shia populaton reside in Balochistan, the Hazara community, which
consists of around 700,000 members, are predominantly Shias.42 Islamist
terror outits like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Almi
(LJ-A), Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP), Hizbul Ahrar (HuA) and Islamic State (IS) have been actvely
involved in targetng Hazara community in Balochistan.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Almi (LJ-A), TTP, HuA and Islamic State are
Islamist terror organisatons, which are stll actve in Balochistan. LJ-A has
mostly claimed the responsibility of atacking Hazara community. The aim
of the militant outit is to transform Pakistan into an orthodox Salafi state.43
A popular opinion among Baloch natonalists is that the state of Pakistan
is supportng extremist outits like LJ-A in order to fight ethno-natonalist
militant outits. According to Shahmeer Baloch, during the Operaton
Zarb-e-Azab, many militant organisatons were disbanded but not all. He
claimed that the then chief minister Balochistan Dr. Abdul Malik, and the
commander of the Army's Southern Command Lt Gen Nasir Khan Janjua,
worked to stabilise the province but the situaton only worsened. This is
because the disbanded and jobless death squads joined the Islamic State,
which has now gained some momentum in the region.44 “In five recent
41 “Mapping the Global Muslim Populaton.” Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project, April
42 Cafiero, Giorgio, and Vinay Kaura. “Sectarian Violence in Balochistan.” Middle East Insttute,
43Nicholas Howenstein, “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introducton to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in
Pakistan and Kashmir,” Pakistan Security Research Unit, Research Report 1, 2008, 35.
44Baloch, Shah Meer. “The Long Insurgency.” DAWN.COM, December 31, 2017. htps://www.dawn.
com/news/1379817.
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atacks claimed by IS, some 220 people were killed and many more
injured.”45 Meanwhile, Pakistan Army argues that since the ban in 2002,
LeJ has been and stll is treated as a terrorist organisaton, by the state and
its insttutons alike.
Results
The most prominent flaw in the cause of ethno-natonalist organisatons
(BLA, BRA or any other militant organisaton) operatng in the province
currently, is their support for secular Balochistan. For the dynamics of
the region and as Khaled Ahmed in his book “Sleepwalking to Surrender”
promotes that a secular objectve cannot establish a strong hold for itself
in this region. On the contrary, only a religiously driven ideological cause
can gather enough people for changing the maps of this region again.
Moreover, the ethno-natonalist insurgency has lost its genuine leadership,
people who ‘talked and walked’ the struggle. Either they have expired,
or are in a self-imposed exile. The new generaton of ethno-natonalist
outits is based in countries such as Britain and Switzerland. Apart from
Dr. Allah Nazar of Baloch Liberaton Front, no organisatonal head (such as
Brahumdagh Bugt and Harbiyar Marri) is currently fightng on the ground
with the forces; in fact they are just giving mere lip service to Baloch cause.
Their supporters or the people of Balochistan have finally started to realise
this fact. Moreover, the two prominent tribes - Bugt and Marri - have also
been divided between ant-establishment and pro-establishment forces.
For instance, Baloch who are fightng under the umbrella of Bugt Aman
Forces (BAF) have started to pick up arms against BLA fighters, whom they
see as nothing but members of Brahumdagh Bugt’s outit that is surviving
on Indian funding.46 For sustaining and giving military training, BLA fighters
obviously cannot wage such an insurgency against the state. Thus, foreign
involvement is undeniable.
45 ibid.
46 “The Good Guns of Balochistan: Why Fighters like Nawab Din Bugt Dropped Their Pens and Picked
up Guns.” Blogs. Accessed December 26, 2019. htps://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/72309/the-good-
guns-of-balochistan-why-fighters-like-nawab-din-bugt-dropped-their-pens-and-picked-up-guns.
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Following the arrest of Kulbushan Jadhav from Balochistan, the
Indian linkage with ethno-natonalist insurgency became more vivid.
Jadhav was a serving Indian-naval officer cum spy. He was sent to
Balochistan via Iran in order to sponsor terrorist actvites and target
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.47 Gwadar has atracted various foreign
hostle intelligence agencies from around the world due to its economic
and strategic importance.48 Meanwhile, “external powers also want its
resources to be governed by an independent Balochistan rather than
Pakistan.”49 The United States does not acknowledge and support the
Chinese plan for Belt and Road Initatve, as well as the creaton of Gwadar
port in Pakistan. Considering the fact that containment of China50 is the
top most priority for Washington right now, it would be justfiable to say
that the US is looking for every possibility to curb the economic growth
of China. Thus, it is also supportng India to plot against Pakistan-China
economic nexus.51 Iran is also keen regarding Balochistan, primarily
because the deep seaport of Gwadar will be an opponent to Iran’s newly
built, Indian funded Chabahar Port. Despite the fact that the Iranians have
ofen voiced Chabahar as Gawadar’s sister port, yet their reservatons are
obvious.52
Saudis are trying to neutralise the Iranian influence by generatng a
sectarian conflict in the province. It is no secret that the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia has supported Sunni religious groups around the world against
Iran. Similarly, in Balochistan they have laid out their cards in an obvious
47 Jawed Naqvi, KulbushanYadev Not alone, DAWN,
2 January
com/1380273
48
“Submit Documents to WikiLeaks.” The Global Intelligence Files - PAKISTAN/SECURITY- Foreign
powers have dangerous designs in Balochistan. Accessed December 26, 2019. htps://wikileaks.org/
gifiles/docs/70/703080_pakistan-security-foreign-powers-have-dangerous-designs-in.html.
49 Shafaqat Mehmood, Center does not hold, The News, 21 January 2015.
51 Shahid, Usman. “Balochistan: The Troubled Heart of the CPEC.” - The Diplomat. for The Diplomat,
August 24, 2016. htps://thediplomat.com/2016/08/balochistan-the-troubled-heart-of-the-cpec/.
52 Notezai, Muhammad Akbar. “Iran-Pakistan at the Crossroads?” - The Diplomat. for The Diplomat,
July 15, 2017. htps://thediplomat.com/2017/07/iran-pakistan-at-the-crossroads/.
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patern.53 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Pipeline project
is also another atracton for states to keep their eyes stuck at Balochistan.
This is because it aims to bring natural gas from Galkynysh and adjacent
gas fields in Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India therefore
making the region energy-efficient and economically progressive. 54
Such internatonalisaton of the insurgency where every state is
trying to secure its stakes and where sincere Baloch leadership is missing
from the picture, has led this insurgency to become fatuous. However, the
recent atack on five-star Pearl Contnental Hotel in Gwadar, on 11 May
2019, which a facton of BLA took responsibility for,55 has opened another
Pandora's box for the cause of Baloch natonalists for according to some
disputed claims one of the terrorists who took part in the operaton was
among the lists of missing persons.56 Missing persons are believed to be
involved in militant actvites by state security agencies. There might even
be a chance that the ordinary civilians are not even aware of this vile cycle
initated and supported by the militants.
However, over a period of nine years, the politcal set up in
Balochistan and Islamabad has changed to a great degree; the government
initated a series of dialogues with the Baloch leadership in exile. To be
specific, in 2015 the Pakistani government approached the Khan of Kalat,
and asked him to come back to Pakistan and start a prosperous life here.57
Moreover, afer May 2013 electon in Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif's government
adopted a mature policy of appointng Dr. Abdul Malik instead of local
53 Correspondent, The Newspaper's Staff. “Centre Struck Deals for Balochistan without Its Consent:
deals-for-balochistan-without-its-consent-jamaldini.
54 Kiani, Khaleeq. “Pakistan, Turkmenistan Sign Deal for TAPI Gas Pipeline.” DAWN.COM, March 13,
55
“Terrorists Storm Gwadar Pearl Contnental Hotel.” Pakistan Today. Accessed December 26,
gwadar/.
56 -, News Desk, -, and News Desk. “Gwadar PC Terror Atack: Yesterday's ‘Missing Person’ Is Today's
terror-atack-yesterdays-missing-person-is-todays-terrorist/.
57 Akbar, Malik Siraj. “Breakthrough in Balochistan.” HuffPost. HuffPost, July 18, 2016. htps://www.
huffpost.com/entry/breakthrough-in-balochist_b_7825970.
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Stratagem
party boss Sana Ullah Zehri as the chief minister of Balochistan. In 2018,
with the PTI government coming into office, the situaton in Balochistan is
gaining new pace as the government is addressing and investgatng into
the mater of missing persons. Official government reports and provincial
facts state that the people who disappeared have started to show up,
some being gone for as long as eight to nine years.58 Such initatves taken
by the government have lef very litle room for militants to breed. When
asked about the curious case of missing persons, Senator Anwar Kakar59
assured that, “the security forces were only taking people who were
involved in some sort of crimes.” He also went on to point out the fighters
who returned to Pakistan afer fightng against ISIS under the command
of “Zainabiyoun Brigade” of Iran.60 The senator was convinced that the
security personnel are operatng against these fighters, in order to hold
them accountable for taking part in “someone else’s war.”
Conclusion
Considering the socio-politcal and sectarian dynamics of ethno-natonalist
militancy in Balochistan, the militants have long lost the essence of their
primary objectve. However, despite this development, the government
stll needs to urgently address the grievances of masses. Albeit, that
government officials and office holders prefer to believe that the recent
wave of ethno-natonalist insurgency is entrely foreign supported but one
cannot deny the fact that without putng your own house in order it is
not possible to inculcate others. The modern, educated, and progressive
generaton of the local Baloch is more sophistcated in their approach. They
are asking for their share in the land resources and provincial autonomy
while stll being a part of Pakistan. Nevertheless, the future of Balochistan
will keep on standing on a precarious turn if productve measures like
58 Akbar, Malik Siraj. “Eight Months in, How Is Balochistan Faring?” DAWN.COM, August 16, 2019.
59AnwaarUlHaq, Kakar (Senator at Pakistan Senate body), interviewed by Mahnoor Saleem, Islamabad,
Pakistan, 2019.
60 Kakar, Abdul Ghani. “Iran's Zainabiyoun Brigade Steps up Recruitng in Pakistan.” Pakistan Forward.
Pakistan Forward, October
5,
2018. htps://pakistan.asia-news.com/en_GB/artcles/cnmi_pf/
features/2018/10/05/feature-02.
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Insurgency in Balochistan
cultural exchange programmes, people-to-people interactons, provincial
insttutonal strengthening and reconciliaton of trust between the
province and the federaton will not be ensured. Economic incentves
for Balochistan can also repair the wounds of history, opportunites like
Natonal Finance Commission award can also help in providing a breath of
fresh air to the poverty-stricken province.
The current Chief Minister of Balochistan Jam Kamal Khan is taking
on all the hurdles coming in the way of prosperity but without creatng a
space for the local people in provincial development projects, the disparity
will only increase. Considering the opportunity, it is bringing to province,
smooth operaton of Gwadar port, CPEC is of paramount importance to
Pakistan, similarly ensuring peace with militants, natonalists, and local
populaton of Balochistan is equally important. A generaton of Baloch was
born and brought up in an insurgency-engaged province, their attude
toward the centre and government is justfiable on several grounds, and
as problems lef unatended have a tendency to turn into crisis. A military
soluton of this province is no longer a reliable resolve, just as the former
President Pervez Musharraf once thought, for in affairs of COIN and counter
terrorism you cut off one head, two shall rise against its place. Therefore,
there is a dire need of genuine negotatons between the federaton and
locals on ad hoc basis for the prosperity of the state and province.
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